by Frederic Colier
Reflexive elements in films
do not escape the binary dialectics of aesthetic and ideological concepts
embedded in them. This rule applies in the four films discussed in this short
paper: “The Man with a Movie Camera;” “Rock Hudson’s Home Video;” “Blow Up;”
and “All About My Mother.” This dialectical presence has been debated
extensively in the history of Arts. Theorists, artists, over time, have
favored either one or the other. Yet, in reflexivity, this binary concept
boils down to a question of awareness. Logically, understanding reflexive
elements in films depends also on consciousness. This consciousness,
nonetheless, is solicited at various degrees. In some instances, in complete
illusionistic films, consciousness is invited to efface itself; in anti-illusionistic
settings, it remains active and aware of its own presence. Understanding how
consciousness functions, in relation to reflexive elements, becomes a
fundamental priority. Because once awakened and educated, it resists
illusionistic devices, consciousness is capable to infer a broader range of
reflexive elements. Indeed, my past filmic knowledge aggregates and associates
new meanings in relation to fresh evidences. The fusion generates new
information. This newly found knowledge enhances a new reflexive awareness.
Virtually all elements composed on the screen, the acting, the mise-en-scène
(the lighting, décor, costume), the camera movements, the potential stilted
lines that the writer wrote, the emphasis of the actor’s lines, and all the
other filmic “tricks” the director has organized, call attention to themselves
by becoming visible and thus expose their artificiality. Reflexive
consciousness is illusion striped of artifice. Hence, consciousness of filmic
techniques destroys any likely illusionistic involvement with the film. The
film’s fictionality reveals itself entirely. From this point on, the film’s
construct must become the subject of scrutiny. Indeed, aesthetic and
ideological concepts become the first part of a dual analysis occurring as
well at the level of the form and content. Both esthetics and ideologies are
contained in films’ form and content. In other words, inferring reflexive
elements in films and understanding their aesthetic and ideological natures is
directly proportional to the viewer’s awareness in relation to their form and
content.
Perhaps the best place to
start this paper is to talk about Vertov’s film “The Man with a Movie Camera.”
The film offers a remarkable example of the duality existing between an
aesthetic approach, contingent to artistic concepts, and an ideological one,
contingent to socio-economical circumstances. This duality is best expressed
through the reflexivity of the film’s form and content. The film is unique to
forward the cause of an illusionistic form through an anti-illusionistic
content. Indeed, in the first place, the abstract style prevents the viewers
from being swayed, from penetrating the documentary. Because the film is based
entirely on footage compilation, (the shots are juxtaposed, and meanings only
then gain coherence), the content undergoes an initial anti-illusionistic
disruption. Disruption awakens awareness. The resistance induced through the
disruption of the content suggests a strong ideological impulse aiming at
creating a new aesthetic. Then, in the second place, the capitalization on
anti-illusionistic depictions of reality, the new aesthetic, creates its own
dilemma: an illusionistic recuperation. The film’s message turns against
itself. The form is nothing else than an ideological reflexivity calling
attention to its own artificial making.
This complex reflexivity is best expressed with
the presence of the tramps sleeping in the street,
and the cameraman’s ubiquitous presence on the screen. Through the exposition
of the tramps, Vertov creates the anti-illusionistic illusionistic
representation of reality. Seeing the tramps only is watching precisely the
content. The tramps are often associated with feelings of sorrow, etc. and,
consequently, invite participation in shared “sympathy.” The coaxing of
emotions is where consciousness disappears. Approaching the content, without
changing the film formal fictional realm would not “prevent the viewer from
identifying with the diegetic world on the screen,” (Petric p7).
The tramps’ presence alone does not suffice to disrupt an illusionistic
representation. Because Vertov wanted people to learn a new consciousness
through films, a collective consciousness, which he believed will improve
their lives, he sought to unveil a new way to make and tell films. Futurist
and Constructivist methods (Constructivists sought to create an art in which
the form would be as important as the content, if not more) came
to the rescue. Vertov’s conceptual aim got achieved through the montage. The
diegetic content of shots could therefore be dismissed; the shots of tramps
were showed isolated from each other. And this isolation rejects emotional
complicity.
The montage’s ideological
importance comes to life with the homage to Gorky paid with the huge banner
hanging across a street (we see the sequences repeated four times). Gorky, one
of the greatest dinosaurs of Russian literature, which means “bitter,” was a
name reflecting Gorky’s own perception on life. Gorky lived most of his life
in Crimea, in the southern part of Ukraine. In his autobiography, “My
University,” Gorky confessed having led an extremely difficult youth and
adolescence. His first stories and novels in fact deal with characters who
roamed and wandered through Russia, mostly vagrants and tramps. This phase of
Gorky’s life came to be known as his “Tramp Period,” which made him the father
of Social Realism, in Russian. Social Realism predicated on the absolute
subordination of form to content. The world of representation in art had to be
mimetic. The coincidence, therefore, between the omnipresence of tramps and
the images of the banner has to be excluded. Montage performed the anti-illusionistic
trick through disjointed associations. Vertov seemed to fabricate a literary
trope through his editing technique by correlating the shots of tramps with
images hinting to a literary tradition. By de-emphasizing the shots’ content,
which is by not juxtaposing the shots of the tramps and the banner, Vertov
reemphasizes instead the importance of the form, and, at the same time,
discards any possible illusionistic involvement. By juxtaposing the two shots,
the content would have been emphasized.
The ideological reflexive
montage betrays the artifice of its own presence at this point. Since the
documentary refers to world of fiction, the verisimilitude of a world of
realistic literature, the reflexive montage disseminates an anti-illusionistic
portrayal while using the literary filmic language that it condemns. Social
Realism invests in the content, estheticizes the content. Vertov, on the
other hand, uses the content of his shots to condemn the content of the
associative shots he has created. By deconstructing Social Realism, he
deconstructs straight linear narrative. Being kept at an aesthetical distance,
the viewers are forced to observe the film’s artifice. Thus the dialectics of
Vertov’s method is clear: filmmakers must not interfere with reality, while
presenting it on the screen in a highly aesthetic and ideological manner. As
Petric observes, about MMC, “the form comes to function as the content,
without disturbing the ontological authenticity of the shots,” (Petric p15).
The shots of the tramps are not altered esthetically, only ideologically
through associations with shots of banner.
Yet, can we claim that the film anti-illusionistic
does not turn against itself, implying that it is also illusionistic? The
non-involvement with the ontological aspect of the shot must be questioned
since the cameraman’s presence on the screen suggests an involvement with it.
By applying Bretch’s strategy of Arts, we could state that Vertov demonstrates
the compatibility of reflexivity as an esthetic strategy, and realism as an
aspiration (Stam p 214).
The presence of the cameraman on the screen leads to this ambiguous conceptual
reversal. Representation of reality, the fiction of realism, remains invalid.
Instead the fiction of a Constructivist representation of reality is favored.
Through his montage experimentation, Vertov wanted to show a new reality, far
from Social Realism’s mimetic methods. This new reality paved the way to show
the camera’s possibilities. The camera is the magician’s magical instrument
with which the cameraman performs filmic tricks under the viewers’ intrigued
and mesmerized eyes. Michelson talks precisely about the “philosophical
phantasm of the reflexive consciousness, the eye seeing,” (Michelson p 98).
“We shall meet with the magician once again in the paradigmatically reflexive
film in which the process of filmmaking, editing, and projection will be
revealed and assimilated, through constant and elaborate parallel montage, to
the processes and functions of labor,” (Michelson p104). The cameraman is the
magician revealing the tricks. The magician is a manufacturer of illusion; he
can in the interest of instruction in order to heighten consciousness destroy
the illusion of the mimetic world. The camera exposes the cameraman in
subsequent shots. Complexity arises since the film is abstract, and the
cameraman portrays the medium’s magical power. Interplay of magic devices is
epistemological. “Only consciousness can fight to the sway of magic,”
(Michelson p105). Thus the consciousness of the filmmaker finds an abstract
way to awaken the viewers’ lack of consciousness. Consciousness is carried out
with reflexive consciousness to disrupt unconsciousness. Vertov do want to
disturb the epistemological image, he wants to retain, like a magician the
ontological belief the film denounces by advocating and promoting the
magicality of filmmaking. And Petric unveils the trick. For him a paradox sees
the light “from the merger of his epistemological attitudes towards the medium
and his aesthetic view of film structure,” (Petric p14), which explains why
MMC retains an illusionistic aura. The film’s structure proves that the
inner realm of reality can be reached only through the aesthetic use of film
language, in both fiction and documentary film, which consists not in
developing the consciousness of the viewers but rather a
consciousness, Vertov’s own. Vertov imposes an illusionistic view of reality.
In other words, the film anti-illusionistic ideological form cannot be
separated from its aesthetic illusionistic resolution to promote its own
cause.
“Rock Hudson‘s Home Movie” offers a classical example of the legitimacy of
truth, narrated through the re-interpretation of the past. The film’s
reflexive thematic conveys this complex question. Precisely, because of its
obvious deformation of facts, the film relies heavily on its aesthetic form.
Although to be immersed within the film’s story, the re-writing of the legend
of Rock Hudson’s true life, at first viewing is easy, the film’s aesthetic
form reveals the reflexive artifice of its own fabrication and disrupts this
possibility.
Right from the beginning of the film, Mark Rapapport behaves, talks, as if he
was really R.H., who we know has died. The film is based on repetition of
divers scenes, sequences, taken from virtually all the films R.H. has
performed in. On the surface, the content carries the narrative subjugation.
Indeed, the content’s very plasticity, conveyed through the humoristic style,
suppresses initial surprise and invites instead to unconscious participation.
Reflexivity can only arise from a distanciation with illusionistic
involvement. Danger remains as long as the viewer opts to delve into the
film’s humorous story. The film’s first level of structural reflexivity comes
from the disruption of belief, established when we understand that the speaker
who pretends to be R.H. is not R.H. The question of truth, as perceived
visually, becomes challenged. Thus by announcing the libidinous, homosexual
character of R.H., the speaker puts a slant on the past sequences. Who really
was R.H.? The film’s irony is generated from this new scripting process. But
since R.H. has been lying to us, and the narrator is not R.H., is he lying as
well? The film would appear to be just another fabrication.
And the film reveals this aesthetic artifice through the form. Focusing solely
on the amusing content would not allow to perceive the latent reflexive
elements. Consciousness must find a ground of interest to retain a separation
with the soporific power of the story. There is, indeed, an assumption on the
speaker’s part that becomes transparent as he keeps on talking: the speaker
understands the past. In the light of hindsight, knowing about the tragedy of
the real R.H.'s death, truth is assumed self-evident. The film fails to
question the present historical revisionism. Clearly the narrator claiming to
be R. H. is not Rock Hudson, does not even have the same voice (although at
times Rock’s voice and the speaker’s alternate over the sequences to the point
of being confounded) but, yet, speaks for him. The nature of the
narrative-revisionism reflects the film’s very subject: the representation of
reality and its fabrication. The film is a fabrication of sequences—a montage.
The very nature of the montage shows explicitly the aleatory nature of story
narration. Same syntagmatic sequences juxtaposed, superposed to different
contexts alter and redefine the images’ signifying contents. Why should an
actor, R.H., who performs no real-life scenes on sets, have to display
publicly his real identity, his own sexual preferences, while acting? We, of
course, normally behave in every aspect of our life the way we behave in our
bedroom. . . . This assumption on the speaker’s part destroys the viewer’s
possible immersion into the illusionistic homosexual recollection and,
consequently, reveals the film’s conceptual problematic. True, Rock Hudson was
gay, but his gayness does not have to be carried out through his acting
performances with other actors. Since these acted scenes are not real, they
only represent the working phases of his life, why should R.H. behave with his
“real and open” gay self in films? All is lies. All truth lies beneath
appearances. And appearances do not necessarily reflect the truth; they are
subject to interpretations. Likewise, Rapapport’s fabrication of Hudson’s life
seems highly hypothetical. Fabrication of one’s own present personality is
also a montage of interpreted facts about past events.
Perhaps we should see a strong condemnation of Hollywood is known for
presenting images of reality that often bear no correlations with “real” life
events. The ideal image of malehood is such an example. The myth of the
beautiful American male with a perfect body is glorified, idealized, and
perennial. Rapapport’s fabrication reveals its own fakeness, the invisible
cracks in the varnish. For example, the film betrays the aging process often
concealed in the illusionistic nature of film stars. A quick montage showing
Hudson’s beauty fading, reveals the passage of time, and awakens consciousness
to the danger of easily adopted illusion. The aesthetical disclosure could
only be achieved with a careful montage.
Hence, truth is questioned through the form. How R.H. managed to conceal the
truth of his own sexuality from the viewers for so long is now revealed. The
viewing of the film invites an aesthetic reflexivity. Indeed, the film
claiming to restore the truth defeats itself; it reflects another fabrication.
Only the consciousness of the falsification of data, the revisionism of
Hudson’s past, allows to maintain the necessary distance to infer the
reflexive form in order not succumb to the unawareness. Through this
reasoning, the film loses completely its illusionary potential. Consciousness
becomes aware of the artifice of the content, and its credibility can only
function with the form aesthetical cooperation. The critical viewer may
approach the film with a slanted eye, a curious stance questioning why this
man on the screen even tries to claim to be R.H., when he does not even
remotely resemble him. Are we dealing with a sort of a glamour-starved artist?
A narcissistic director who wishes to portray his own secret desires,
indulging in an sexual aesthetics betraying a narcissistic ideology: one uses
already existing films, adds a personal touch to it, and claim ownership and
artistic creativity? Are we watching a neurotic man who has difficulties in
expressing his own potential homosexuality and does so by exposing others’ in
a way to legitimize his own (he lives his own inclinations through a mighty
icon and gets a sense of identity through some else's “fake” filmic
testimonies). Speculations are easy. Yet, the film could also simply be a
statement about the hypocrisy of Western societies forcing homosexuals to
perform parts that do not correspond to their psychological make-up. Gay
people become likewise an aesthetic montage of roles, aiming at substituting,
hiding, their true gay nature in order to remain unnoticeable. Denied a voice
in the present, Rapapport’s recycling of old materials becomes his voice of
assertion. Like Hudson, gays are dead, or considered non-existent, and yet
like the director, they are very much alive. And the film aesthetic form,
conveyed through the montage, reflects this artificial dissimulation.
The film becomes interesting at this point because the concept of unveiled
gayness reflects current preoccupation with queer studies. The film’s content
can only but falls flats on its head. Once again consciousness of cultural,
sociological circumstances thwarts the viewers’ adhesion to the illusionary
effacement. The mechanisms of filmmaking are not exposed directly; they become
apparent, visible through the form’s aesthetic artifice. Or else, they are
betrayed by the ideological awareness that stripped the film’s aesthetic
values from its aims.
“Blow up” is a good example of a film that exposes the filmic
mechanism used for its own making, without ambiguity. Yet, unlike the two
previous films, its reflexivity is exposed through the content. But since the
medium’s “formal” aspect is questioned through the content, the film’s
reflexivity is therefore based on an ideological content.
Antonioni’s film does not convey an anti-illusionistic representation of
reality, unlike MMC. The film’s very subject, the nature of the use of
the medium, on the contrary, tackles thoroughly the nature of reality and its
representation in an illusionistic fashion. At first, it is misleading. In
exposing the countless photographic apparatus and the steps involved in the
process of making of photograph, the film’s reinforces an aesthetic
questioning, without suppressing the aesthetic distance and preventing the
viewers’ consciousness from slipping away completely from the story/plot being
told. The nameless photograph sees the world through the distorted lenses of
his camera. He accidentally attends to a crime, which had completely escaped
his attention and which is only revealed through the process of blowing up a
photograph. The human eye, very much like in Vertov’s claim, does not seem to
be able to see what the machine can. The eye may see but does not necessarily
register. The photograph, (D. Hemming), curiously, appears to be baffled by
the discovery of the assassination. He begins to investigate the crime.
Paradoxically, unlike the mechanical process of glamour photography, the
modeling of young women, which is overly exhibited, the pictures of the
assassination are genuine and cannot be reproduced. This parallel of the real
and the fake goes at the core of the nature of the perception of reality. Real
physical violence had taken place in the park under the photographer’s eyes,
and he has failed to perceive it. This violent reality is cleverly portrayed
also with a contrast between the models, the falsification of a reality, and
the unrehearsed smuggled pictures of workers in factories, standing both
respectively for glamour and social violence. Indeed, the way the photographer
treats the models is never included in the final products, the photographs
making the covers of magazines. His cruelty, humiliation, anger, violence, and
condescension, while asking them to smile, are left out of the fabrication
process. Likewise, the photograph does not seem to be interested in the
workers. What interests him are the photographs of the workers, whose
coarse realism he beautifies through “photographic subversion.” He looks at
them with aesthetic pleasure, not with ideological concerns. The social
violence, the harshness of working conditions and their consequences on the
workers, is entirely removed. But because the film exposes overly this
aesthetical pleasure by contrasting it with the assassination, the ideological
appreciation of reality becomes the reflexive element. The photographer shows
how all aspects of the representation of reality whether fabricated, the
models, or not, the workers, can become the product of an illusionistic
process of corruption. This representation is best expressed while he
investigates the murder with the tools and machines used to represent this
reality.
The short sequence, perhaps, juxtaposing these photographs with canvasses of
the painter-friend explicitly introduces the aleatory artistic nature of
representation. The photographer stares at the painting for a while; they have
an abstract quality. The artist’s vision, we can assume, parallels the
photographer’s. The paintings just like the pictures are artifacts of reality,
whose purpose is entirely devoted to the aesthetic pleasure. In both
instances, the representation of reality corresponds to the artists’ vision,
not to the mimetic perception of reality. Content prevails over the form.
The voyeuristic nature of the criminal investigation, on the other hand,
creates a break with this aesthetic pleasure. The aim becomes ideological
since the photographer wants to reconstruct the true event. Reality can no
longer be blurred, fabricated, falsified; the photographer wishes to recapture
it. Reality is violence. The photograph’s voyeuristic investigation echoes the
violent pictures’ taken in the park where the crime took place. Voyeurism
perhaps is aesthetic violence. This dichotomy of perception and appearance of
reality, nonetheless, echoes ours while we observe the film. Blowing the
pictures up one after the other is a way to discard any possible aesthetic
corruption, to retrieve a pure sense of reality. Are there different
realities: one aesthetic and ideological? In “Blow up” one sees reality, seeks
truth, with ideological eyes, not with an aesthetic one, perhaps because the
film makes us aware that the unconscious knowledge of the world’s brutal
reality makes us escape into pure illusion.
The film makes a remarkable turn-around from the aesthetic to the
ideological nature of reality, following the photographs’ disappearance from
the studio. This disappearance signals the questionable impressions reality
leaves upon us. After the photographer returned to double-check that the dead
body is still in the park, he comes to distrust his own belief about the
actual crime. This doubt about perception is reinforced, exposed, with the
group of mimes and clown, at the end of the film, faking a game of tennis,
without rackets and ball. The gestures are so accurately recaptured that the
public of clowns and the photograph end up partaking in an imaginary game. The
ball flies over the net and lands in the grass. The woman mime beckons the
photographer to fetch the ball. He hesitates for a second but then submits to
the command, thus acknowledging his complicity with the making of an illusory
reality. A strong message is implied through his collusion: the illusionistic
construction of reality is not exclusively a personal matter. Often, to
perform well in society, one must accept, conform to the rules of the game.
The fictional nature of the representation of reality is not always an
isolated process; it is also collectively maintained and generated. The
pictures of models are fashioned in a similar vein: we end up believing in
their artifice. If we fail to pay attention we fall prey to them. The
aesthetic pleasure involved in voyeurism maintains the wall of illusion, of
wish fulfillments, and of escapatory desires. Artifice is generated with the
help of one another.
The film is remarkable to expose this tendency with the ability not to severe
completely the trajectory of the thematic exposition from the viewer’s
attention, while, at the same time, using the very theme about the nature of
reality as the subject of investigation, to reinforce their awareness on the
ideological level. The film portrays how we participate while watching the
film in this self-dupliciting representation. This distanciation without the
distancing allows Antonioni to reestablish the deficient balance of ideology.
Consciousness is aroused, educated, without risk of pleasurable pacification,
which is, nonetheless, in itself a pleasurable feeling.
The case for Almodovar’s film, “All About my Mother,” complicates the debate
of reflexive inferences. For a start the film is made to be completely
illusionistic at the level of content. The reflexive elements in relation to
consciousness require tremendous work on the part of the viewers in order to
be discerned. Of the film’s content, we could say, therefore, that
consciousness is driven by an enormous reflexive aesthetic.
Unlike in Godard’s films, for example, where cinematic references are inserted
within the film and often act as suspensory devices, the story during the
“quote” ceases to progress. In Almodovar’s, this aesthetic content does not
apply. Indeed, the reflexive elements are part of the story. They are used as
props for the story where they are completely integrated. The sequence with
Eve, in “All about Eve,” entering Bette Davies’s dressing room is
inscribed within the context of the film’s story. Even tough the characters,
Manuela and Her son, are watching the film, talk about it, references to Eve
act a prologue for things to come. Furthermore, this reflexive insert in “All
About my Mother” is more complex than Altman’s “Player,” which merely limits
itself to dialogued-based “quotes,” as well as some intertextual hints, such
as the posters on the wall whose presence is rendered obvious with the
camera’s shift of focus. In Almodovar’s, such directness does not exist
either. The reflexivity is subtle: the interpenetration of the film’s artifice
with reality is completely fused. Reality depicted in the content is artifice
only because this artifice is the reality.
This aesthetic reflexivity is also portrayed in the characters. Indeed, the
reflexive characters only come to life in mimetic parallel. Eve, the fictional
character of “All about Eve,” with her machiavelic approach to life, her
ruthless manipulations, is Manuela’s antithesis. Eve does not carry any
reflexive weight in isolation, her character only acquires aesthetic dimension
when contrasted to Manuela: one is fictional, the other is supposedly real.
Yet they mirror each other. Manuela is Eve. Scenes between the two films
intermingle. Manuela’s arrival at the theater equals Eve’s. Both are
strong-willed, endowed with unbending spirited to achieve their goals, with
the difference that Manuela’s aims are saintly governed, Eve’s are evil.
Manuela forces the other characters, Huma, Rosa, Rosa’s Mother, and Estevan
into awareness through her good will, unlike Eve who is driven to acknowledge
her mistakes by G. Sanders. This reversal is precisely the consciousness the
film forces upon us. Manuela is our reflexive consciousness; great characters
are not only on the screen but also in life (even if life is still the
screen). Along with Williams’s play, since the film goes back and forth
between the stage and the dressing room, from rehearsals to live performances,
and sometimes the street, we are reminded that life is not only on the stage
but also outside of it. And indeed the fiction of drama is extended to the
outside as if an extension of the play. Dialogues on stage continue without a
break outside the stage. She plays the fake wife for the medical institute’s
commercial, and then become the real mother signing her son’s organs off,
repeating words and gestures recorded for the commercial. Likewise, Agrado
confesses the real traumas of his miraculous sex transformation—up on a stage.
The fake and real discourses constantly intermingle. Art and drama are not
longer distinguishable. Perhaps not knowing on which side we stand make us
appear like little kids, like the “diapers” commercial implicitly suggests.
Almodovar perhaps wants to warn us of the danger of the artistic creation, the
film, preventing us from grasping a genuine sense of reality, because we find
easy to believe the fiction of films, while drama remains overwhelming present
all around us, ignored.
This interpenetration of art and reality is especially noticeable with the use
of colors. Manuela’s house is divided in two colors, yellow and red; the
stage of “Streetcar” is blue. Rosa’s mother represents best the fusion of art
with reality since she is a painter, with the particularity to be devoid of
any imagination. She spends her time reproducing Chagal’s colorful paintings,
whose backgrounds are often rich with strong primary colours, deep blue,
bright red, pure yellow. These paintings are noticeable behind the speaking
characters as if to enlighten the viewers about the characters’ moods.
Almodovar shows us his characters as if they were living models in paintings.
The choice of location as Barcelona also reinforces this point, since the town
is known for its extreme beauty. People live tragic lives among genuine
artistic treasures; Gaudy is famous for his colorful mosaics found all over
Barcelona. They give the town its perfect imprint of artistic integration,
showing that drama is not limited to the screen. The columns appearing outside
Agrado’s apartment provides a good example of the fusion. Both characters and
décor live the art. “All about my Mother” represents a gigantic canvass, made
out of a single composition.
The film is the vision of an artist, not only mastering his craft, but also
having a clear understanding of the aesthetical effect the work carries. This
mastery on both planes surrenders the film’s true reflexive quality,
represented by the stylistic rendition. Noticing this quality does not break
the aesthetic distance. The film, nonetheless, does not remain completely
illusionistic, because the fusion of both worlds places the film on the
perfect middle point between illusion and anti-illusion. Indeed, the viewer,
without disappearing in the expected dreamland, is too mesmerized by the
film’s finely chiseled dramatic beauty.